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Calif. Taxpayers Due Refunds May NOT Get Cash
By Patrick Healy
If you expect you'll be getting a refund from California when you file your 2008 state income tax return, be prepared: you may instead receive a "registered warrant." Translation: an IOU.
California is rapidly running out of money. Blame it on the state budget deficit that continues to bleed billions of dollars from California's reserves. Facing inadequate credit to make up the difference, California's Controller John Chiang warns that by the end of February, the nation's most populous state may not be able to pay some of its debts, and instead be reduced to issuing those creditors IOUs.
"My office has projected that, in approximately 60 days, there will be insufficient cash available to meet all expenditures reflected in the 2008-09 Budget Act," stated a Tuesday letter from Controller Chiang to the directors of all state agencies. "To ensure that the State can meet its obligations to schools, debt service, and others entitled to payment under the State Constitution, federal law, or court order. California may begin, as early as February 1, 2009, issuing registered warrants...commonly referred to as IOUs...to individuals and entities in lieu of regular payments."
California has not resorted to IOUs since the 1992 budget crisis when Pete Wilson was governor. Back then, some 100,000 state employees got IOUs instead of paychecks for two months until the state approved a budget. The 1992 crisis came during summer, well past the tax season, but at least 12,000 tax refunds were also issued as IOUs, according to a contemporaneous report in the Los Angeles Times.
State workers filed a lawsuit, arguing the IOUs violated the federal Fair Labor Standards Act. They were awarded damages. In this current cash crisis, The Controller's office expects that hourly state employees would continue to receive paychecks. But IOUs could be issued to elected state officials, including legislators and judges, and their appointed staff, some 1700 in all, "as well as tax refunds owed to individuals and businesses," according to Chaing aide Hallye Jordan.
The Controller himself remains in a Texas hospital where he was taken after falling ill during a visit with family. Chiang has remained in communication with his staff by phone, Jordan told NBC Los Angeles Tuesday evening.
The Controller's office will not take the emergency steps outlined in the letter to state agencies, Jordan said, if California can resolve its budget crisis in the next few weeks. But no new budget package has been proposed since the one presented by Democratic lawmakers was rejected by Governor Arnold Schwarzenegger as inadequate. "We've made very little progress the past couple of weeks," said Aaron McClear, an aide to Gov. Schwarzenegger, while the Governor was away from the capital on a holiday vacation.
Even without a deficit resolution, issuing IOUs is not the only option for tax refunds. The state could simply delay payment. Under the law, it has until May 30, Jordan said.
In 1992, banks honored the state's IOUs, cashing them on demand, and then receiving an additional 5% from the state when it made good on the obligations. In effect, the IOUs served the state as unsecured bridge loans from banks. But this time around, with credit tight and banks still feeling the impact of the fall meltdown in the financial services industry, it is not yet clear how banks will respond.
"Nobody's making any decision whether 'Bank X' will take the IOUs as money or not," said Brian Tobin, a Culver City based tax preparer. At the request of NBC Los Angeles, Tobin reviewed a copy of Chiang's letter. Tobin noted that in past years, California's Franchise Tax Board has processed electronic refunds in as short a period as a week. This raises the possibility that taxpayers with simple returns who file as soon as possible after New Year's may be able to receive refunds before the proposed February start date for issuing IOUs.
Those who could be most affected are taxpayers who routinely plan for large refunds as a means of saving for anticipated expenses, such as property taxes which are also due in April. But with notice coming at year's end, there is not time for those taxpayers to adjust their withholding or take other steps to try to capture their return in advance from the state's coffers. "They've got their money taken out of your paycheck. That's it," Tobin said.
One final irony, Tobin sees: electronic deposit refunds are inexpensive to do. Instead sending out IOUs is a more costly procedure for a state looking to save money.
Creative borrowing catches up with California cities
Financing schemes that sidestepped voter approval have put local governments deeper in hock.
By William Heisel
December 31, 2008
Brian Vander Brug / Los Angeles Times
“They’re circumventing the intent of the law,” says Larry Stein, an Oxnard accountant and longtime activist, of the city's sale and lease-back of its streets. “They’re indebting the taxpayers using future revenue streams that may or may not pan out in the long run. But the taxpayers have no say.”
Oxnard was in a bind, facing a $150-million bill to fix cracking and crumbling streets and no way to pay for the work without cutting other services.
The city had tried, and failed, to get voters to approve a bond measure for street repair. And it had borrowed money against almost all of its public property, including a soccer stadium, three fire stations and its library -- even the Police Department's evidence-storage building.
With virtually nothing left to hock, the city came up with an ingenious way to take on more debt: It borrowed against future revenue by "selling" its streets to a city-controlled financing authority.
"We had way too much construction work to do and way too little money," said Ken Ortega, Oxnard's public works director. "We really pulled every creative financing string we could to come up with the money."
Desperate for cash in a sputtering economy, local governments throughout California are digging themselves deeper into debt, and many are doing so through exotic financing schemes designed to sidestep the need for voter approval.
California cities, counties and other agencies borrowed $54 billion last year, nearly twice as much as in 2000, and governments are straining under the load.
Statewide, 24 cities and public agencies missed scheduled debt payments this year or were forced to tap reserves or credit lines to stay current, records show. That's up from nine in 2006, according to the bond industry's self-regulatory agency.
The city of Vallejo, burdened with huge debt obligations, in May became the largest city in California history to file for bankruptcy protection. Chula Vista, Orange County and Palmdale are among the other cities and counties staring at red ink.
Much of this borrowing binge was made possible by complex financial schemes such as the one Oxnard used. These nontraditional debt vehicles cost more over the long run because they are considered riskier than general-obligation bonds, which governments stand fully behind. Investors therefore demand higher interest rates.
"There are many cities and counties engaging in complex financial deals that they don't really understand," said Michael Greenberger, former head of the trading division of the Commodity Futures Trading Commission. "And now it's starting to catch up with them."
BLAME WALL STREET'S PHANTOM BONDS FOR THE CREDIT CRISIS
The “credit crisis” is largely a Wall Street disaster of its own making. From the sale of stocks and bonds that are never delivered, to the purchase of default insurance worth more than the buyer’s assets, we no longer have investment strategies, but rather investment schemes. As long as everyone was making money, no one complained. But like any Ponzi Scheme, eventually the pyramid begins to collapse.
For the last couple of months trillions of dollars worth of US Treasury bonds have been sold but undelivered. Trades that go unsettled have become an event so common that the industry has an acronym for it: FTD, or fail to deliver.
What’s the result? For the federal government, it’s an unnecessarily high rate of interest to finance the national debt. For states, it’s a massive loss of potential tax revenue. And for the bond buyers, brokerage houses, and banks, it’s yet another crash-and-burn to come.
First, a primer: The Federal Government issues as many bonds as Congress authorizes (the total value is an amount that basically covers the national debt). Many are purchased by brokers and investors, who then re-sell them in “secondary” trades. The way the system is supposed to work is that the broker takes your bond order today and tomorrow takes the cash from your account and ‘delivers’ the bonds to you. The bonds remain in your broker’s name (or the name of a central depository, if he uses one). If there is interest, the Treasury pays the interest to your broker and he credits your account for the amount.
What is happening today that strays from this model? Because the financial regulators do not require that the actual bonds be delivered to the buyer, your broker credits you with an electronic IOU for them, and, eventually, with the interest payments as well. But the so-called “bonds” that you receive as an electronic IOU, called an “entitlement”, are phantoms: there aren’t any bonds delivered by your broker to you, or by the government to your broker, or by anyone.
The significant result of the IOU system is that brokers are able to sell many more bonds than the Congress has authorized. The transactions are called ‘settlement failures’ or ‘failed to deliver’ events, since the broker reported bond purchases beyond what the sellers delivered. Since all of this happens after the US Treasury originally issues the bonds, the broker’s bookkeeping is separate from US Treasury records. That means there is no limit on the number of IOUs the broker can hand out...and there are usually more IOUs in circulation than there are bonds.
The ramifications are far reaching for the national budget. Wall Street, by selling bonds that it cannot deliver to the buyer — in selling more bonds than the government has issued — has been allowed to artificially inflate supply, thereby forcing bond prices down. These undelivered Treasuries represent unfulfilled demand by investors willing to lend money to the US government. That money — the payment for the bonds — has been intercepted by the selling broker-dealers. The subsequently artificially low bond prices are forcing the US government to pay a higher rate of interest than it should in order to finance the national debt.
The market for US Treasury bonds has been in serious disarray since the days immediately following September 11, 2001. Despite reports, reviews, examinations, committee meetings, speeches, and advisory groups formed by the US Treasury, the Federal Reserve, and broker-dealer associations, massive failures to deliver recur and persist. Somehow, government, regulators and industry specialists alike believe that it’s OK to sell more bonds than the government has issued. It shouldn’t take a PhD-trained economist to tell you that prices are set where supply equals demand. If a dealer can sell an infinite supply of bonds (or stocks or anything else for that matter), then the price is, technically-speaking, baloney. And the resulting field of play cannot be called a “market”.
If regulators and the central clearing corporation would only enforce delivery of Treasury bonds for trade settlement — payment — at something approaching the promised, stated, contracted and agreed upon T+1 (one day after the trade), there would be an immediate surge in the price of US Treasury securities. As the prices of bonds rise, the yield falls. This falling yield then translates into a lower interest rate that the US government has to pay in order to borrow the money it needs to fund the budget deficit and to refinance the existing national debt.
This week’s drop in the yield on US Treasuries was accompanied by a spike in bond prices. The data won’t be released until next week, but you can expect to see that a precipitous drop in fails-to-deliver occurred at the same time. Don’t get your hopes up, though. One look at the chart above will tell you that the good news won’t last until real changes are made to the system.
As a bonus insult to government, consider the $270 million in lost tax revenues to the states. This is because investors (unknowingly) report the phony interest payments made to them by their brokers as tax exempt; interest earned on US Treasury bonds is not taxed by the states.
For the bond buyer, the situation poses other problems and risks. As an ordinary investor, you’re not notified that the bonds were not delivered to you or to your broker. Of course, your broker knows, but doesn’t share the information with you because he or she plans to make good on the trade only at some point in the future when you order the bond to be sold.
The electronic IOU you received can only be redeemed at your brokerage house, and no one knows what will happen if it goes under, although I suspect we’ll find out in the coming quarters as more financial institutions get into deeper trouble. You’re probably not aware that, in order to cash in that IOU when you’re ready to sell, you depend not on the full faith and credit of the US government, but on your broker being in business next month (or next year) to make good on the trade. In other words, you’re taking Lehman Brothers risk, and receiving only US Government risk-free rates of return on your investment.
Your broker, meanwhile, enjoys the advantages of commission charges for the trade, maybe an account maintenance fee and – more importantly – they use your money for other purposes. Wall Street is not sharing any of this extra investment income with you. In my analysis of Trade Settlement Failures in US Bond Markets, I calculate this “loss of use of funds” to investors at $7 billion per year, conservatively.
Despite this, rather than require that sold bonds be delivered to the buyer, the Treasury Market Practices Group at the Federal Reserve Bank of New York merely points out FTDs as “examples of strategies to avoid.”
Now for the really bad news. The tolerance for unsettled trades and complete disregard for the effect of supply on setting true-market prices is also responsible for the "sub-prime crisis," which everyone seems to agree on as the root of the current global financial turmoil. You see, there are more credit default swaps — CDS — traded on mortgage bonds than there are mortgage bonds outstanding. A CDS is like insurance. The buyer of a mortgage bond pays a premium, and if the mortgage defaults then the CDS seller makes them whole. CDS are sold in multiples of the underlying assets.
A conservative estimate is that $9 worth of CDS “insurance” has been sold for every $1 in mortgage bond. Therefore, someone stands to gain $9 if the homeowner defaults, but only $1 if they pay. The economic incentives favor foreclosure, not mortgage work-outs or Main Street bailouts.
In the same process that is multiplying Treasury bonds, sellers are permitted to “deliver” CDS that were not created to correspond with actual mortgages; call them “phantom CDS”. According to October 31, 2008 data on CDS registered in the Depository Trust & Clearing Corporation’s (DTCC) Trade Information Warehouse, about $7 billion more CDS insurance was bought on Countrywide Home Loans than Countrywide sold in mortgage bonds. That provides a terrific incentive to foreclose on mortgages.
Countrywide is the game’s major player: The gross CDS contracts on Countrywide of $84.6 billion are equivalent to 82% of the $103.3 billion CDS sold on all mortgage-backed securities (including commercial mortgages) and 90% of the total $94.4 billion CDS registered at DTCC sold on residential mortgage-backed securities.
General Electric Capital Corporation is the fifth largest single name entity with more CDS bought on it than it what it has sold; someone is in a position to benefit by $12 billion more from consumer default than from helping consumers to pay off their debt. Only Italy, Spain, Brazil and Deutsche Bank have more phantom CDS than GECC, according to the DTCC’s data.
The US auto manufacturers also have net phantom CDS in circulation: $11 billion for Ford, $4 billion for General Motors, and $3.3 billion for DaimlerChrysler (plus an additional $3.5 billion at the parent Daimler). Of course, these numbers change from week to week and only represent CDS voluntarily registered with the DTCC, so the real numbers could be much greater.
Who stands to gain? There is no transparency for CDS trades, which means that we don’t know who these buyers are. But in order to get paid on these CDS, the buyer must be a DTCC Participant… and that brings us to Citigroup, Goldman Sachs, JP Morgan and Morgan Stanley – all Participants at DTCC and instrumental in designing and developing CDS trading around the world. By the way, these firms are also in the group that reports FTDs in US Treasuries; the top four firms represent more than 50% of all trades. You can do the math from there.
The US government and regulators are in the best position to end these fiascos, turn us away from casino capitalism, and return our financial industry back into a market. It won’t require any new rules, laws or regulations to fix the situation. If someone takes your money and doesn’t give you what you bought, that’s just plain stealin’, and we already have laws against that.
Susanne Trimbath, Ph.D. is CEO and Chief Economist of STP Advisory Services. Her training in finance and economics began with editing briefing documents for the Economic Research Department of the Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco. She worked in operations at depository trust and clearing corporations in San Francisco and New York, including Depository Trust Company, a subsidiary of DTCC; formerly, she was a Senior Research Economist studying capital markets at the Milken Institute. Her PhD in economics is from New York University. In addition to teaching economics and finance at New York University and University of Southern California (Marshall School of Business), Trimbath is co-author of Beyond Junk Bonds: Expanding High Yield Markets .
Fed Selects Four Firms to Manage MBS Purchase Plan
By Craig Torres and Jody Shenn
Dec. 30 (Bloomberg) -- The Federal Reserve chose BlackRock Inc., Goldman Sachs Asset Management, Pacific Investment Management Co. and Wellington Management Co. to manage a $500 billion purchase of mortgage-backed securities it plans to complete by June.
“They picked the crème de la creme of the money managers,” said Art Frank, head of mortgage-bond research at Deutsche Bank AG in New York. “By doing $500 billion by June, no question they’re doing their best to try to hold down mortgage rates.”
The collapse of U.S. mortgage finance last year led to the worst credit crisis in seven decades and triggered write downs and losses at financial institutions exceeding $1 trillion. The central bank has expanded credit by $1.3 trillion over the past year through programs extending liquidity to banks, bond dealers and other financial institutions. The Fed plans to create money to purchase the bonds, boosting bank reserves.
Only fixed-rate agency mortgage-backed securities guaranteed by Fannie Mae, Freddie Mac and Ginnie Mae will be eligible for purchase, the central bank said in a statement released in Washington today. The purchases, to start early in January, will include securities with maturities of 30, 20, and 15 years, and will exclude riskier securities such as interest- only bonds, the Fed said.
The Fed’s program is intended to lower rates by reducing the supply of outstanding agency mortgage bonds, boosting their prices and thus lowering their yields. Lower yields in turn reduce the interest rates banks need to charge on new mortgages to ensure profitable sales of the securities.
‘Very Quickly’
“It looks like they’re really going to ramp this up and it’s going to be done very quickly,” said Credit Suisse analyst Mahesh Swaminathan. Thirty-year mortgage rates could fall to an average 4.75 percent, he said, and “this is going to take it down sooner rather than later.”
The average rate on a typical U.S. fixed-rate mortgage fell to 5.22 percent early yesterday, the lowest since 2005, from as high as 6.46 percent in October, according to Bankrate.com data. The Treasury also bought $49.7 billion of the companies’ home- loan securities from September through last month.
“The investment managers will be required to purchase securities frequently and to disclose the Federal Reserve as principal,” the central bank said. “Each investment manager will be required to implement ethical walls that appropriately segregate the investment management team” that implements the Fed’s purchases from advisory and proprietary trading teams, the Fed said.
‘Minimal’ Risk
The central bank said risk on the securities would be “minimal” and “mitigated by the conservative, buy-and-hold investment strategy” of the program.
Fed officials announced the program Nov. 25 and said the action was taken to “reduce the cost and increase the availability of credit for the purchase of houses.”
The government hasn’t stemmed the decline in housing even after channeling $172 billion in new capital to banks. The Fed has provided $535 billion in loans to banks as of Dec. 24. Slumping sales and tight credit helped push home prices in 20 major U.S. cities a record 18 percent lower in the 12 months to October, according to the S&P/Case-Shiller index released today.
GMAC Widens Lending as U.S. Injects $6 Billion to Help Save GM
By Rebecca Christie and David Mildenberg
Dec. 30 (Bloomberg) -- GMAC LLC, bolstered by a $6 billion federal bailout, resumed lending to General Motors Corp. customers with lower credit scores as the U.S. widened its effort to keep the automaker in business.
The Treasury said yesterday it will take a $5 billion stake in Detroit-based GMAC, the financing arm of GM, and lend $1 billion to the automaker so it can support GMAC. Within hours, GM was offering no-interest loans for as long as five years to counter this year’s 22 percent drop in sales, caused in part by the inability of its customers to get financing.
Reviving GM’s sales has become a priority for U.S. policymakers including the Federal Reserve because of concern that the automaker and its suppliers might go bankrupt and deepen the year-old recession by firing millions of workers. The funds for GMAC are on top of $13.4 billion the Treasury agreed earlier this month to lend to GM and Chrysler LLC.
“The economy has stopped on a dime, and the Fed is looking anywhere there are large markets they can affect in big ways,” said Greg Prost, chief investment officer at Ambassador Capital Management in Detroit, which manages about $800 million. “If they are going to save the car companies, there is going to have to be financing.”
GMAC will now offer financing to vehicle buyers with credit scores of 621 or higher, compared with a previous standard of at least 700, according to a company statement. The higher threshold had excluded about 42 percent of U.S. consumers.
The company said it won’t finance “higher-risk transactions,” instead concentrating on prime customers who are more likely to repay using “responsible credit standards.” The relaxed policy “will allow us to return to more normal levels of financing volume, and should help in efforts to stabilize the U.S. auto industry,” GMAC President Bill Muir said in today’s statement.
Helping GM
The lender financed about 35 percent of GM’s retail customers and about three-quarters of dealer inventory last year. GM, which sold 51 percent of GMAC in 2006 to a group led by private equity firm Cerberus Capital Management LP, is seeking a permanent federal bailout to avert bankruptcy. Cerberus also owns Chrysler, which it acquired last year.
The collapse of financial globalization…
Posted on Monday, December 29th, 2008
By bsetser
The last six months — if not the last year — logged what felt like a decade’s worth of financial news. So perhaps it isn’t surprising that swings that normally would attract an enormous amount of attention have gone almost unnoticed. Like the near-total collapse of private capital flows.
Both private capital inflows to the US and private capital outflows from the US have fallen sharply. They have gone from a peak of around 15% of US GDP to around zero in a remarkably short period of time…
The fall in private flows over the last four quarters has been much sharper than the fall in the US current account deficit. The current account deficit continues to hover around $700 billion (5% of US GDP). Financial globalization — the growth in private cross-border flows, and associated rise in private inflows and private outflows — doesn’t seem to have been as central to the ability of the United States to sustain large current account deficits as some thought back in 2004 and 2005.
…But even if “private” Treasury purchases since mid-2007 are counted there still would have been a stunning fall in private capital flows. Direct investment flows have continued. Other financial flows though have largely gone in reverse, with investors selling what they previously bought. In the third quarter foreign investors sold about $90b of US securities (excluding Treasuries) and Americans sold about $85 billion of foreign securities. And the reversal in bank flows on both sides (as past loans have been called) has been absolutely brutal.
This sharp fall has bearing on the bigger debate over the role global capital, global savings and foreign central banks played in helping to to create the conditions that allowed US households to sustain a large deficit for so long — and whether American and other policy makers should have paid more attention to the risks that came with the surge in foreign demand for US financial assets earlier this decade.
…Think of the process this way. Suppose a US bank lends a billion dollars to a bank in London that lends that money to a hedge fund domiciled the Caribbean that buys a billion dollars of US securities. That chain results in an outflow and inflow, but the outflow just financed the inflow — it doesn’t help to finance the current account deficit. By contrast, China’s purchases of Treasuries and Agencies reflect in large part China’s current account surplus — not Chinese banks borrowing from US banks. They certainly help to finance the US current account deficit.
I think we now more or less know that the strong increase in gross capital inflows and outflows after 2004 (gross inflows and outflows basically doubled from late 2004 to mid 2007) was tied to the expansion of the shadow banking system.
It was a largely unregulated system. And it was largely offshore, at least legally. SIVs and the like were set up in London. They borrowed short-term from US banks and money market funds to buyer longer-term assets, generating a lot of cross border flows but little net financing. European banks that had a large dollar book seem to have been doing much the same thing. The growth of the shadow banking system consequently resulted in a big increase in gross private capital outflows and gross private capital inflows.
Those private flows have now disappeared, or even reversed. They actually started to disappear back in August 2007. That didn’t keep the US from continuing to run a large (5% of GDP) current account deficit. The fall in private flows has been far sharper than the fall in the current account deficit.
Why didn’t the total collapse in private flows lead financing for the US current account deficit to dry up? That, after all, is what happened in places like Iceland — and Ukraine.
My explanation is pretty straightforward.
Central banks were the main source of financing for the US deficit all along. Setting Japan aside, the big current account surplus countries were all building up their official reserves and sovereign funds — and they were the key vector providing financing to the deficit countries.
And when (net) private demand for US assets fell, official flows picked up. As I noted earlier, private purchases of Treasuries after June 2007 are almost certainly really official flows. If those purchases are added to recorded official flows, total official flows over the last four quarters of data (q4 07 to q2 08) now almost match the current account deficit.
…Central banks lent the proceeds of their swap lines with the Fed to private banks abroad, and private banks in turn repaid their maturing dollar debts — so the swap lines financed the unwinding of existing US loans to the rest of the world. Call it facilitating the unwinding of some of the legacy of the excesses of the past few year. Or call it a new wave of financial globalization, one led by the central banks…
Consumer confidence index at all-time low
Conference Board's measure sinks amid dismal job market and credit crunch.
By Julianne Pepitone, CNNMoney.com contributing writer
Last Updated: December 30, 2008: 10:53 AM ET
NEW YORK (CNNMoney.com) -- A key measure of consumer confidence fell to an all-time low in December amid a dismal job market and uncertain outlook for the new year.
The Conference Board, a New York-based business research group, said Tuesday that its Consumer Confidence Index fell to 38 in December from the downwardly revised 44.7 in November.
Economists were expecting the index to increase to 45.5, according to a Briefing.com consensus survey of economists.
"The further erosion of the Consumer Confidence Index reflects the rapid and steep deterioration of economic conditions that occurred in the fourth quarter of 2008," said Lynn Franco, director of the Conference Board Consumer Research Center, in a statement.
Wachovia senior economist Mark Vitner said that assessment is "right on the money."
"It looks like the uptick in November was a knee-jerk response to the presidential election being over," he said. The "false reading in November" bumped their expectations too high, leading to disappointment this month, Vitner added.
The gloomy news came at the end of a full year of recession. The credit crunch has strained the financial system as central banks struggle to raise capital.
Home prices post record 18% drop
The 20-city S&P Case-Shiller index has posted losses for a staggering 27 months in a row.
By Les Christie, CNNMoney.com staff writer
Last Updated: December 30, 2008: 10:08 AM ET
NEW YORK (CNNMoney.com) -- Home prices posted another record decline in October, falling 18% compared with a year earlier, according to a closely watched report released Tuesday.
The 20-city S&P Case-Shiller index has posted losses for a staggering 27 months in a row. In October, 14 of the 20 cities set fresh price decline records.
"The bear market continues; home prices are back to their March 2004 levels," says David Blitzer, Chairman of the Index Committee at Standard & Poor's.
Sunbelt cities suffered the most, but most of the country is watching home values fall. In Phoenix prices have plunged 32.7% since October 2007, Las Vegas home values are down 31.7% year-over-year, while San Francisco prices fell 31%. Miami, Los Angeles and San Diego recorded year-over-year declines of 29%, 27.9% and 26.7%, respectively.
"As of October 2008, the 20-City Composite is down 23.4%," said Blitzer. "In October, we also saw three new markets enter the 'double-digit' club."
Atlanta, Seattle and Portland reported annual rates of decline of 10.5%, 10.2% and 10.1%, respectively.
"While not yet experiencing as severe a contraction as in the Sunbelt, it seems the Pacific Northwest and Mid-Atlantic South is not immune to the overall demise in the housing market," Blitzer added.
Deteriorating environment
Many of the factors affecting home prices turned strongly negative this fall, according to Blitzer.
"October was really the first month to feel the full brunt of the credit crunch," he said. "Up until the Lehman Brothers [bankruptcy filing on September 15], everyone felt relatively optimistic."
Plus, in many of the free-falling cities distressed properties, such as foreclosed homes and short sales, make up a majority of real estate sales. These houses tend to sell at a steep discount to the rest of the market, and when they account for a large proportion of all sales, they can exaggerate the depth of price declines.
Of course, foreclosures continue to be a big problem as well. In October alone, nearly 85,000 people lost their homes to foreclosures, adding vacant inventory to an already overburdened market.
Home sellers should not expect prices to improve any time soon, according to Pat Newport, a real estate analyst for IHS Global Insight.
"I expect it's going to get quite a bit worse over the next couple of months," he said. "Existing home sales reports have really been bad."
And although interest rates are currently extremely low, that's doing more to help people refinancing existing mortgages than it is to help new home buyers.
"Buyers still have to have a 20% down payment," said Newport, "and, in this environment, it can be hard to meet that criteria."
Holiday Sales Drop to Force Bankruptcies, Closings
By Heather Burke
Dec. 29 (Bloomberg) -- U.S. retailers face a wave of store closings, bankruptcies and takeovers starting next month as holiday sales are shaping up to be the worst in 40 years.
Retailers will close 12,000 stores in 2009, according to Howard Davidowitz, chairman of retail consulting and investment- banking firm Davidowitz & Associates Inc. in New York. AnnTaylor Stores Corp., Talbots Inc. and Sears Holdings Corp. are among chains shuttering underperforming locations.
More than a dozen retailers, including Circuit City Stores Inc., Linens ‘n Things Inc., Sharper Image Corp. and Steve & Barry’s LLC, have sought bankruptcy protection this year as the credit squeeze and recession drained sales. Investors will start seeing a wide variety of chains seeking bankruptcy protection in February when they file financial reports, said Burt Flickinger.
“You’ll see department stores, specialty stores, discount stores, grocery stores, drugstores, major chains either multi- regionally or nationally go out,” Flickinger, managing director of Strategic Resource Group, a retail-industry consulting firm in New York, said today in a Bloomberg Radio interview. “There are a number that are real causes for concern.”
Sales at stores open at least a year probably dropped as much as 2 percent in November and December, the International Council of Shopping Centers said last week, more than the previously projected 1 percent decline. That would be the largest drop since at least 1969, when the New York-based trade group started tracking data. Gap Inc. and Macy’s Inc. are among retailers that will report December results on Jan. 8.
Women’s Clothing, Electronics
Consumers spent at least 20 percent less on women’s clothing, electronics and jewelry during November and December, according to data from SpendingPulse.
Retail Metrics Inc.’s December comparable-store sales index will drop an estimated 1.2 percent, or 5 percent excluding Wal- Mart Stores Inc. Retailers’ fourth-quarter earnings may fall 19 percent on average, the seventh consecutive quarterly decline, according to Ken Perkins, president of Retail Metrics, a Swampscott, Massachusetts-based consulting firm.
Probably 50,000 stores could close without any effect on consumer choice, Gregory Segall, a managing partner at buyout firm Versa Capital Management Inc., said this month during a panel discussion held at Bloomberg LP’s New York offices. Only retailers with healthy balance sheets will survive the recession, according to Matthew Katz, a managing director at consulting firm AlixPartners LLP.
Store Closings
About 200,000 stores may close in 2009, compared with a record 160,000 in 2008, Flickinger said.